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TITLE INSURANCE: THE DUTY TO SEARCH
A DEFECT in ownership or title is said to exist when the aggregate of
rights, privileges, powers, and immunities known as ownership is subject to
the claims of others.1 Such claims may restrict the use which can be made of
the property and as a corollary may reduce its market value.2 The possible
types of title defects are myriad. Some defects will be disclosed by a search
of the public transfer records; others will be disclosed only by a physical
examination or a survey of the property itself; still others may remain undis-
closed even after physical examination and consultation of public records.
Often the existence of title defects will depend upon complex and confusing
legal doctrines.4 Since the average layman has neither the skill nor the means
to discover or protect himself against all possible defects in his title, he must
1. The concept of ownership as a bundle of rights, powers, privileges, duties, and im-
munities has often been expressed. See, e.g., BLODGETT, COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
24 (1944) ; GAGE, LAND TITLE AsSURING AGENCIES 17 (1937) [hereinafter cited as GAGE];
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 1-10 (1936).
Absolute ownership of all the bundle of rights by a single individual would be difficult
to find since ownership is subject to such governmental claims as taxes, zoning, and
eminent domain, as well as being subject to public interest claims through the common law
doctrine of nuisance. See PROSSER, TORTS § 70 (2d ed. 1955) ; Hunt, Federal and State
Control of Land: A Synopsis, in McDOUGAL & HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: AL-
LOCATION, PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT 70, 75, 83-90 (1948). To any given interest holder
these claims, as well as adverse rights held by another person, are defects in his ownership
bundle. See GAGE 19-23; McKillop, Title Insurance, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 447, 448 (1955).
2. See, e.g., W. F. White Land Co. v. Christenson, 14 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928) (restrictive covenant in deed coupled with a defeasance clause); Wilkinson v.
Nassau Shores, Inc., 1 Misc. 2d 917, 86 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1949) (easement); BASYE,
CLEARING LAND TITLES § 5, at 16 (1953) [hereinafter cited as BASYE].
3. Where tax liens must be filed before attachment for example, a search of the
public records will disclose the existence of such a defect. See United States v. City of
New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). But where a tax lien or priority arises without the need
to file, searching the records will not disclose the defect. See Core, Tax Forfeiture Problems
in the Examination of Abstracts, 12 ARx. L. REv. 333 (1958) ; Title News, Jan. 1959, pp.
62-65. Similarly, where mechanics' or materialmens' liens must be recorded before attach-
ment, search of the public records will discover the defects. However, as in the more
usual case, when such liens relate back to the date of commencement of work or furnish-
ing of materials, physical inspection of the property and not mere search of the public
records is necessary to ensure full discovery of this type of defect. See Comment, 68 YALE
L.J. 138 (1958) ; OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 214 (1951). For examples of different statutory
treatment of the priority of mechanics' liens, see N.Y. LIEN LAw § 13 and ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 87.025(1) & (2) (1953). Encroachments and other possessory rights of long standing
which through the doctrine of adverse possession have become legally protected also
necessitate physical inspection or a survey. See, e.g., SI-Es, THE IMPROVEMENT OF
CONVEYANCING By LEGISLATION 37,44 (1960).
4. The nature of defects and their discovery often depend upon local property law,
recording statutes, or the prevailing method of holding property. See generally GAGE 34;
Smith, Insurance of Titles to Property, 8 J. LAND & P.U. EcoN. 337 (1932).
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rely upon a specialized individual or institution.5 In recent years title in-
surance has become an increasingly widespread means of answering this need.0
However, because title insurance characteristically combines search and dis-
closure with insurance 7 protection in a single operation, confusion has re-
sulted as to the exact nature and extent of the title insurance company's
obligations beyond those as insurer.
It might seem that attempting to resolve the question whether a title
company has a legal duty to search 8 is engaging in meaningless verbalism,
since the company is already liable under the insurance contract. In many
situations, however, finding a duty to search may increase the liability of
the title company. The insured may be able to recover damages in excess
of the face amount of the policy.9 The insured may also recover damages
where no recovery would be possible on the insurance contract, because the
duty to search may extend to items not expressly covered by insurance pro-
visions.10 There may even be recovery for a defect of a type covered by a
5. To a layman a-search is a mystery, and the various pitfalls that may beset his title
are dreaded, but unknown. To avoid a possible claim against him, to obviate the
need and expense of professional advice, and the uncertainty that sometimes results
even after it has been obtained, is the very purpose for which the owner seeks
insurance.
Empire Dev. Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 225 N.Y. 53, 57, 121 N.E. 468, 470
(1918). See GAGE 34.
6. Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YAIE L.J. 492, 493 (1957) ; Zerfing, Title Insurance
and Its Background, Title News, Oct. 1953, pp. 16-22.
7. A variety of semantic problems lies hidden in the apparent simplicity of the generic
term "insurance." Various commentators have stated that title insurance is solely in-
demnification insurance. See, e.g., 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 32 (5th ed. 1952) ; Pelkey,
The Law of Title Insurance, 12 MARQ. L. lxv. 38, 43 & nn.25-31 (1927). The cases do not
wholly bear out this oversimplification. See, e.g., Maggio v. Abstract Title & Mortgage
Corp., 277 App. Div. 940, 98 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1950) (in the nature of a guarantee or wager) ;
Empire Dev. Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E. 468 (1918) (in
the nature of a warranty). Courts seemingly adopting the indemnification definition have
sometimes verbalized the problem on a different level by varying the definition of "loss."
Compare Foehrenbach v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 217 Pa. 331, 66 Atl. 561
(1907), with Udell v. City Title Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 78, 208 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1960).
8. Implicit in the duty to search is a duty to disclose; search without disclosure would
be generally meaningless from the owner's point of view. Consequently the "duty to search"
as used in this Note will include both search and disclosure obligations.
9. See Quigley v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co., 60 Minn. 275, 62 N.W. 287 (1895),
connected case, 64 Minn. 149, 66 N.W. 364 (1896); Mezzaluna v. Jersey Mortgage &
Title Guar. Co., 109 N.J.L. 340, 162 Atl. 743 (1932); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 972 (1958) ;
letter from F. W. Audrain, Chief Counsel, Security Title Insurance Company, Los Angeles,
California, to the Yale Law Jonrnal, April 24, 1961, on file in Yale Law Library ("tort
liability has no limit as to what might be charged against the title insurer").
Implicit in awarding the insured greater damages than the face amount of the policy
is the idea that the face amount applies only to the insurance provisions and not to the
implied or express search provisions.
10. Greater recovery may be possible because: (1) should a tort theory of liability be
adopted for breach of the duty to search, the scope of proximately caused damages would
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blanket exception clause or for a defect specifically excepted in the policy.1
Finding a duty to search may also enable the insured to avoid conditions
in the policy. For example, he may circumvent the standard insurance con-
tract condition that before recovery is allowed loss must be actually realized
rather than merely accrued. 12 Similarly, conditions providing for notice may
be avoided.' 3
It seems helpful to approach the basic question of whether an obligation to
search exists in addition to insurance obligations by examining the historical
development of title insurance.1 4 The simplest and oldest method of assuring
title is the title attorney's search and opinion. He examines the public records,
weighs the facts in light of existing law, and then renders his opinion as to
the condition of title.15 _An outgrowth of the title attorney method, the abstrac-
ter system, differs but little from the earlier institution. 16 Neither of these
methods adequately protects the individual against possible future losses
since the scope of duty owed to the client is only that of reasonable care
usually be broader than that for breach of a contractual undertaking. PROSSER, TORTS § 81,
at 478 (2d ed. 1955) ; and (2) the scope of a "reasonable search" may be broader than
the terms of the insurance policy itself. See Henkels v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 177
Pa. Super. 110, 110 A.2d 878 (1955) (item excepted from insurance policy was not excepted
from scope of duty to search).
11. If a duty to search is imposed on the title insurer, the question of whether a sub-
sequently discovered defect causing loss to the insured will give rise to liability will turn
on whether a reasonable search would have discovered the defect, and not on whether that
defect fell outside of the broad classes of hard-to-discover defects usually excepted from
the policy. Even where the defect is specifically exempted in the policy, this may not
satisfy the reasonable searcher's duty to disclose fully the nature and legal effect of the
defect. Thus in Dorr v. Massachusetts Title Ins. Co., 238 Mass. 490, 131 N.E. 191 (1921),
there was recovery for a defect expressly excepted in the subsequently issued insurance
policy because circumstances were such that the title company should reasonably have
given notice of the defect.
12. See Blessing v. American Title & Ins. Co., 121 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1960) ; Booth v.
New Jersey Highway Authority, 60 N.J. Super. 534, 159 A.2d 460 (1960) ; Udell v. City
Title Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 78, 208 N.Y.S2d 504 (1960) (dictum); Pelkey, The Law of
Title Insurance, 12 MARQ. L. REv. 38, 51 & nn.61-63 (1927). Such conditions may also
be avoided by the simple expedient of ignoring them. See Fifth Mut. Bldg. Socy of
Manayunk's Appeal 317 Pa. 161, 176 Atl. 494 (1935).
13. Compare Houston Title Guar. Co. v. Fontenot, 339 S.W.2d 347, 353 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960) (amount expended by insured prior to notice not recoverable as a matter of
law), with Kentucky Title Co. v. Hail, 219 Ky. 256, 266, 292 S.W. 817, 822 (1927) (under
implied contract to search insured did not have to satisfy condition precedent before re-
covering). Exact compliance with notice requirements may also be avoided by the doctrines
of anticipatory breach, repudiation, or waiver. See, e.g., Purcell v. Land Title Guar. Co.,
94 Mo. App. 5, 67 S.W. 726 (1902) ; American Fidelity Cas. Co. v. Williams, 34 S.W.2d
396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
14. For an excellent discussion of the causes leading to the development of title
insurance, see GAGE 78-85. See also West, History of Title Insurance, Title News, Jan.
1957, p. 8; Rhodes, The Insurance of the Real Estate Title, 10 CoNN. BJ. 115 (1936).
15. GAGE 39-42,47-49.
16. Id. at 42-43.
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in making a title search. Thus there is no liability for defects which cannot
be discovered with reasonable care.17 Title insurance purported to remedy this
inadequacy by insuring against losses from defects not disclosed by a reason-
able search.'8 This insurance function might have developed separately from
searching. In fact, however, because title insurance was a natural outgrowth
of the previous searching institutions and because any insuring agency would
desire to appraise the risks involved before insuring, the early title in-
surance company typically performed the title search as well.19
The combination of search and insurance exists today in a variety of forms.
The majority of title insurers operate as "title-plant companies," maintaining
duplicates of the public records and carrying out their own independent
searches. 20 This form of organization displaces the ordinary practitioners from
the title examination process and substitutes the insurance policy for the
lawyer's opinion.21 A second form of company, typified by the Lawyers'
Title Guaranty Fund, issues what have been called "lawyer-title policies." 22
17. Such defects may spring from two major sources: (1) facts which are not discover-
able by a reasonable search. See, e.g., National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) ;
Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770, 775 (W.D. Ark. 1953) ; (2) discoverable facts which may
be improperly evaluated by what would nonetheless be a reasonable exercise of an attorney's
or abstracter's opinion. See, e.g., Toth v. Vazquez, 3 N.J. Super. 379, 65 A.2d 778 (1949) ;
Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161, 98 Am. Rep. 213 (1868). See generally Wade, The
Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 774 (1959) ; Roady, Professional
Liability of Abstracters, 12 VAND. L. REv. 783 (1959).
18. It has been said that the establishment in 1876 of the first title insurance company
in America, the Real Estate Title Insurance Company, resulted as a reaction to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's restriction of the scope of conveyancer's liability in the
celebrated case of Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161, 98 Am. Rep. 213 (1868). See GAGE 80-85;
see generally PUBLIC REGULATION OF TITLE INSURANCE CO.MPANIES AND ABSTRACTERS §
0.30, at 13-14 (Roberts ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as VILLANOVA REPORT].
19. The dual purpose of the early companies is indicated by the initial advertisement
of the first title insurance company:
"The company insures the purchasers of real estate and mortgages against loss
from defective titles, liens, and encumbrances.
"It has at its command the knowledge and experiences of the leading coveyancers
of this city as well as the information relative to real estate title accumulated by
them during many years past ....
"Insurances are effected only after a thorough examination and search as to
encumbrances."
GAGE 82; see NORTH & VAN BUREN, REAL ESTATE TITLES & CONVEYANCING 248 (1940)
[hereinafter cited as NORTH & VAN BuEN].
20. See NORTH & VAN BUREN 248, 251 (1940) ; Payne, The Why, What, and How of
Uniform Title Standards, 7 ALA. L. REv. 25, 27 (1954).
21. Payne, supra note 20, at 27.
22. Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund was developed by Florida lawyers in order to give
their clients the same protection against "non-apparent" and "undisclosed" risks as does
the more usual form of title insurance. Carter, Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund, 8 U. FLA.
L. REv. 480-81 (1955).
A similar company, the Lawyers' Title Insurance Company of Richmond, is the major
company writing such policies on a nationwide basis. See Johnstone, supra note 6, at 505 &
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Such policies are issued on the basis of applications from lawyers who have
performed the traditional search rather than on the basis of independent
investigations of title by the company itself.23 A third form of company, very
similar to the second, insures title on the basis of an abstract furnished by an
approved abstract company.4 "Title-plant companies" adopt both the second
and third forms of organization in extending their business into geographic
areas in which they do not have title plants.2 5 Still another organizational
form appears to be developing: there have been reports of title insurers who
issue policies on the basis of little or no preliminary title search.26 This
development reflects the ultimate in the casualty or actuarial approach. The
distinctions between these various combinations of search and insurance are
blurred by variations in the operations of and scope of coverage afforded by
each company.27
The protean variety of forms and practices, coupled with changes in the
wording of title policies 28 and changes in searching methods,29 has under-
n.52. Apparently Virginia is the only state in which the use of title insurance based on at-
torney searches predominates. See REPORT OF THE COmmITEE ON AccEPTABLE TITLES
To REAL PROPERTY, PRoc. A.B.A. Szc. REAL PROP., PRO. & TRusT LAW 43, 50 (1953).
23. See Payne, supra note 20, at 26-27.
Considering the inefficiency of many states' public records, it may be doubtful whether
title insurance based upon an attorney's search can survive in competition with a "title-
plant company" unless the attorneys adopt some superior method of record keeping such
as the title plant or exert sufficient legislative pressure to cause improvements in the keeping
of public records. See NORTH & VAN BuREN 50-51, 225-26; THOMPSON, ABsTmAcTs &
TrrLEs § 98, at 186 (1930). But see Johnstone, supra note 6, at 517.
24. NORTH & VAN BuREN 248.
25. See ibid; Payne, supra note 20, at 26; Johnstone, supra note 6, at 505, 523-24.
26. See, e.g., Tarpley, The Future of Title Insurance, Title News, Oct. 1959, p. 24;
Report of Chairmen of Regional Districts, Title Insurance Executive-1957-1958 Ad-
ministration, Title News, Jan. 1959, p. 102; Curtis, Title Insurance, Converting from
Abstracts to Title Insurance, Title News, May 1953, pp. 2-3. Competition is probably the
primary reason for the increase in casualty type title insurance. See Beiniker, Why We Be-
have Like Titlemen, Title News, July 1959, pp. 14, 19.
27. See notes 48-49 infra and accompanying text.
28. The history of the Chicago Title & Trust Company exemplifies the type of wording
changes which make definition of the title companies' undertaking more difficult. Until
1933 the company issued a preliminary report which stated:
Our examination of the title to the property hereinafter described is completed to
include [a certain date] and on said date we find title of record in ....
RErnv, GUARANTEEING MARETABnITY OF TiTLXs To REAL EsTATE 98 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as REEV]. Because of pressures from the local Bar Association which expressed views
that the Company was practicing law by making such a judgment, the Company changed to
their present statement of readiness to issue a title policy and of the items which the
policy would contain. Id. at 99. Such a change in working makes far less clear the intent
of the title company to make a title seach for the benefit of the insured.
29. As the insurance companies have increased the scope of risks insured against, they
have kept an ever-widening range of records. See Johnstone, mpra note 6, at 507. This
collateral expansion of recorded materials has encompassed areas in which it is far from
certain that a reasonable search could or should be made, and accordingly may obfuscate the
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standably engendered confusion concerning the nature and extent of the title
insurer's duty to search. 0 In facing (or avoiding) the question courts have
"come up with many and diverse results."3' In the absence of an express
promise to search title, some courts have looked to circumstances surrounding
the issuance of the policy and implied from these a duty to search.32 A
large number of cases, however, predicate liability solely in terms of indemnifi-
cation or insurance.33 It is not always clear whether the failure to discuss or
extent of the insurer's duty to search. See notes 78-82 infra and accompanying text. To
offset the danger of an expanded duty title companies have introduced exculpatory clauses
into their policies and preliminary papers, thus further confusing the question of their
search function. See notes 50-51 infra and accompanying text. Perhaps the greatest changes
in searching methods, however, have been the making of limited searches by companies
relying on policies previously issued by other insurers and the abandonment of a search
by a few companies operating on a purely actuarial basis. See Johnstone, supra note 6, at
516; note 26 supra.
30. Compare J. H. Trisdale, Inc. v. Shasta County Title Co., 146 Cal. App. 2d 831,
304 P.2d 832 (1956) (both tort and contract causes of action upheld on demurrer), with
Maggio v. Abstract Title & Mortgage Corp., 227 App. Div. 940, 98 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1950)
("doctrine of skill or negligence has no application" to title insurer's liability). Compare
Kentucky Title Co. v. Hail, 219 Ky. 256, 292 S.W. 817 (1927) (company discovered error
in description and was under a duty to disclose), with Sala v. Security Title Ins. &
Guarantee Co., 27 Cal. App. 2d 693, 81 P.2d 578, 582 (1938) (company discovered lis
pendens but had "right to include or omit a reference to the lis pendens ... as it chose").
The uncertainty has not gone altogether unnoticed by the title industry:
What representations do we make in the issuance of the policy? Is there a repre-
sentation of the nature of the examination? If there is such a representation-is
there liability in the nature of an abstractor's [sic] liability over and above the liability
of an insurer under the terms of the policy?
Howlett, A Look at Title Losses and Liability Assumed, Title News, Jan. 1960, pp. 76, 78.
31. Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 125, 331 P.2d
742,747 (1958).
32. In one case, for example, a duty to search was implied from a letter sent by the
title company to the client stating that title had been examined and that a policy of in-
surance would subsequently be issued. On this basis the court found that:
[The company] undertook to act for plaintiff in two capacities-as a conveyancer,
who examined the title and undertook to advise her whether it was good and market-
able, and as an insurer, who undertook to insure that she had a good and marketable
title. In the former capacity, the [company] assumed the same responsibilities and
owed to the plaintiff the same duty as if it had been an individual attorney or
conveyancer.
Glyn v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 859, 861-62, 117 N.Y. Supp. 424,
426-27 (1909). See Dorr v. Massachusetts Title Ins. Co., 238 Mass. 490, 131 N.E. 191
(1921) ; Ehmer v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 156 N.Y. 10, 50 N.E. 420 (1898).
33. E.g., Diel v. Security Title Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d 808, 298 P.2d 873 (1956);
Russell & Co. v. Polk County Abstract Co., 87 Iowa 233, 54 N.W. 212 (1893); Pioneer
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cantrell, 71 Nev. 243, 286 P.2d 261 (1955); Hilfor v. United
States Mortgage & Title Guar. Co., 14 N.J. Super. 456, 82 A2d 463 (1951) ; Montemarano
v. Home Title Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 478, 180 N.E. 241 (1932); Fifth Mut. Bldg. Socy
of Manayunk's Appeal, 317 Pa. 161, 176 Atl. 494 (1935) ; Buquo v. Title Guar. & Trust
Co., 20 Tenn. App. 479, 100 S.W.2d 997 (1936).
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find liability for negligent search results from the plaintiff's failure to plead a
good cause of action in negligence or from a determination that the liability
of the company rests solely on the insurance policy and that the policy itself
does not create a duty to search.u
In attempting to resolve the confusion over the existence of a duty to
search, at least four alternatives are open to the courts:
(1) finding in the title policy or accompanying papers an express contract
to search the title;
(2) finding from the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the policy
an implied-in-fact contract to search;
(3) finding in the relationship of the parties a duty to search; or
(4) finding that the title policy is limited solely to an insurer's contract to
insure good title with no undertaking and no duty to search.
As the fourth alternative is merely the result of rejecting the other three,
it requires no separate analysis here. Moreover, only the first two alternatives
seem to fall readily within traditional contract doctrines, and their feasibility
thus warrants careful consideration before the third alternative is reached.
If a court could find an express undertaking to search title-the first alter-
native suggested-no question would arise concerning the existence of a duty
to search. The title policy itself, except in rare instances, makes no mention
of a search,35 and there is generally no separate employment contract con-
taining a specific undertaking to search title.8 6 It may be possible, however, to
find an express undertaking in the papers issued prior to the insurance con-
tract. These preliminary papers may take a variety of forms. For example, the
insured may simply receive a letter stating that a policy will be issued or that
34. See, e.g., Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 37 Cal. 2d 644, 234 P.2d 625 (1951);
Booth v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 60 N.J. Super. 534, 159 A.2d 460 (1960).
The court in Hocking held that the insured's complaint failed to state a cause of action,
apparently deciding-with no direct discussion of negligence-that the insured's loss was
not within the policy coverage. The opinion is unclear as to whether the failure to state a
cause of action was due to the fact that the company was not negligent or to the fact that
negligence was irrelevant in a suit by an insured policyholder.
Booth in contrast discussed but did not find liability for negligence. The complaint, which
alleged both tort and contract causes of action, was dismissed. It is not clear whether the
decision was based upon the court's conclusion that the "contract of title insurance, as
distinguished from that of employment to examine the title to premises, does not involve
liability for negligence," or its conclusion that the insured "knew of the uncertainty" and
consequently did not rely upon the alleged negligent action of the title company, or,
finally, its finding that there was "no proof whatsoever of any loss or damage to the
plaintiff." 60 N.J. Super. at 538,159 A2d at 461-62.
35. None of the standard policies recommended by the American Title Association
expressly mentions a title search. See VILLANOVA REPORT, apps. A & B. For further ex-
amples of title policies see Johnstone, mspra note 6, at 521-24; REEvE 229-40.
36. The failure in the overwhelming majority of the cases to mention the existence of
a separate contract to search title would seem to indicate no such separate contract is made.
But see Henkels v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 177 Pa. Super. 110, 113, 110 A.2d 878, 880
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title has vested in him subject to certain defects, or he may receive a more
formal report or certificate of title.3 7 Though the preliminary papers may
expressly state that the insurer has duly searched the title and discovered the
defects noted,38 they will usually be ambiguous as to the undertaking to
search.39 In many instances, moreover, these papers explicitly state that the
liability under the certificate is limited to the issuance of a title policy.4 0 Thus,
the alternative of grounding a duty to search on an express contractual under-
taking is not ordinarily available.
In the absence of an express promise, a court must consider the second
alternative-whether there is an implied-in-fact contract to search title. One
may argue that the insurance policy and preliminary papers suggest the
existence of such a contract. The policy itself generally insures against loss
or damage from defects in title subject to certain exceptions set out in the
policy and in the preliminary papers.41 The listing of defects in the particular
title would seem to imply that a search was made to discover these defects.
(1955) (separate oral contract) ; Kentucky Title Co. v. Hail, 219 Ky. 256, 292 S.W. 817,
818 (1927) (separate contract implied from fact insurer was to receive 4 of fee if no
policy issued for "its time and expense in the investgiation of the title") ; Title Ins. Co.
v. Industrial Bank, 156 Va. 322, 157 S.E. 710 (1931) (court manufactured a separate
undertaking out of pure fiction).
37. See Carrier, The Customer's Viewpoint, Title News, Jan. 1960, p. 60. The author
categorizes the four main types of preliminary papers in current use: (1) a preliminary
letter showing a report of title but stating that there is no liability thereunder; (2) a letter
stating that a policy of insurance will be issued; (3) an interim insurance binder stating
that title is vested in a certain person subject only to certain enumerated defects and further
stating that the interim binder will be "null and void" upon subsequent issuance of the policy;
(4) a commitment to insure which is similar to an interim binder but lists certain general
exceptions besides showing specific defects. For illustrative forms see NORTH & VAN BURE"
201-08.
38. See GAGE 70-71; REEnV 63, 69. For examples of such statements see, e.g., Metro-
politan Title Guarantee Co. v. Gildenhorn, 249 F.2d 933, 935 n.5, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
M.R.M. Realty Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 120; 200 N.E. 666 (1936).
39. See, e.g., Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 234-36,
214 Pac. 667, 668-69 (1923) ; Marandino v. Lawyers' Title Ins. Corp., 156 Va. 696, 159 S.E.
181 (1931); cf. Carrier, supra note 37, at 63 ("None of these preliminary title reports
gives a person who is purchasing a home for the first time sufficient information to determine
what he should do to see that his interests are fully protected.").
40. Thus in Udell v. City Title Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 78, 208 N.Y.S. 2d 504 (1960),
the title certificate stated:
[T]he Company's liability ... under this certificate is limited to the issuance of a
policy of title insurance as of closing day in its usual form for the amount stated
below and this certificate shall become null and void upon the issuance of such policy."
Defendant-Appellant's Brief, pp. 26-27 [on file Yale Law Library]. A similar provision was
involved in Union Realty Co. v. Ahern, 93 A.2d 84 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952).
41. See notes 35 and 37.upra.
42. See, e.g., Miller v. Lawyers' Title Ins. Corp., 112 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Va. 1953);
Marandino v. Lawyers' Title Ins. Corp., 156 Va. 696, 159 S.E. 181 (1931). But see Pioneer
Title Ins. Co. v. Cantrell, 71 Nev. 243,286 P.2d 261 (1955).
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However, a listing of some defects does not necessarily mean that these are the
only defects, and thus such a listing may not constitute a representation that
a complete search has been made.43 The use of blanket clauses excepting
general classes of defects also weakens any inference of an undertaking to
search title.44 This ambiguity may require turning from construction of the
contract and preliminary papers to consideration of the practices which were
employed in writing the insurance. One technique, employed in some cases, is
to characterize the various functions assumed by title companies-for example,
the actual searching of title, the writing of contracts, and the transfer and
recording of deeds-as analogous to those performed by an attorney and
consequently to hold the insurance company to the same title-searching duties
as an attorney.45 Advertising to the effect that title insurance is the "only
complete service" may well strengthen such an inference. 46 This functional
analogy is somewhat weakened, however, by decisions holding that a title
insurance company may not practice law.4 7 A better technique would be to
examine the practices employed by the company in the specific case and on that
basis determine both the reasonable man's expectations as to the scope of his
contract and the "manifested" intent of the company.48 For example, inquiry
should be made as to how extensive a title search, if any, the title company
has actually made in the past, whether the title company maintains a title plant,
43. An additional factor militating against the implication of a search from a listing of
exceptions lies in the fact that insurance companies which have made a search commonly
do not list defects which are so minor as to be de minmnis. See REEVE 72-73, 77. This omis-
sion suggests that the companies themselves do not consider listing of defects as equivalent
to a representation that a search has been made.
44. Since the company is specifically denying liability in the areas excepted, it would
seem reasonable to suppose the company is also failing to perform an expensive search
operation in such areas. Insofar as such areas may be within the scope of a reasonable
search, blanket exception seems to deny that a reasonable search was made.
45. See Bridgeport Airport Inc. v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 111 Conn. 537, 150 Atl.
509 (1930) ; Sandier v. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co., 66 N.J. Super. 597, 169 A.2d
735 (1961); Mezzaluna v. Jersey Mortgage & Title Guar. Co., 109 N.J.L. 340, 162 Atl.
743 (1932) ; Glyn v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 859, 117 N.Y. Supp. 424
(1909).
46. See Movietime-A.T.A., Title News, Sept. 1960, pp. 20-32 (includes still shots
from the movie "A Place Under the Sun") ; Title News, May 1960, pp. 18-19 (advertise-
ment) ; Let Title Inmrance Help You Build and Sell Houses, Title News, Dec. 1961, pp.
2, 3,4-5.
47. See, e.g., Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957);
New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Ass'n, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257(1960) ; but see Bar Ass'n of Tenn., Inc. v. Union Planter's Title Guar. Co., 326 S.W.2d
767, 780-81 (Tenn. App. 1959).
48. No broad generalization concerning specific practices can be made since there
is "great diversity.., in different sections of the country" and wide variance even within
one same area. REE E 101; see id. at 96-108. Thus judicial inquiry into the specific practices
employed by the title company would seem necessary for an intelligent interpretation of
that company's title insurance policy. See Sala v. Security Title Ins. & Guarantee Co., 27
Cal. App. 2d 693, 81 P.2d 578 (1938).
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whether a separate charge is made for the search or whether a charge is made
even in the event that a title insurance policy is not subsequently issued, and
what representations the company has made in its advertising and solicita-
tions.49 The opinions in title insurance cases indicate that most courts are
failing to make such inquiries.
Even where it is possible to find an express or implied contractual under-
taking to search title, a court may be faced with an attempt by the company to
disclaim in the written contract itself any liability other than that specified in
the insurance policy.50 In order to escape the burden of making a thorough
title search, title companies may also expressly deny liability for defective title
search in preliminary papers. The insurer often states in these papers that his
liability is restricted to the subsequent issuance of an insurance policy.51 Al-
though this exculpation may avoid the danger of the customer being misled, such
evasion of liability for negligent searching may be so unfair and undesirable
as a matter of public policy that it should be prohibited. r2
It is arguable that neither the insured nor society is injured in the long
49. Such inquiries are of the type usually made by courts interpreting contracts whose
meaning is not clear. The court should attempt to place itself, as nearly as possible, in the
position of the parties to the contract. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Murray, 84 A.2d
870 (Md. App. 1952); see generally RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 226-36 (1932); 3
CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 555-56 (2d ed. 1960).
50. An example of the type of language is set forth in Sandier v. New Jersey Realty
Title Ins. Co., 66 N.J. Super. 597, 601, 169 A.2d 735, 737 (1961) :
[O]bligation and liability . . . hereunder shall be limited to and established in the
manner provided by, and the amount of loss ... shall be ascertained in accordance
with, the scope and conditions of this policy ... and not otherwise.
The American Title Association Standard Owner's Policies contain the following clause:
Any action or actions or rights of action that the Insured may have or may bring
against the Company arising out of the status of the title insured herein must be
based on the provisions of this policy.
ViLLANovA REPoRT, app. B, at 317, 328.
51. See note 40 supra.
52. Determination of the validity of such exculpation clauses appears to depend ultimate-
ly upon balancing the freedom of contract against the possible harm to the public resulting
from allowing such exculpation. See Jackson v. First Natl Bank, 415 Ill. 453, 459-60, 114
N.E.2d 721, 725 (1953). The specific rationale adopted in declaring exculpatory clauses
invalid seems to vary with the laws of particular states. Consider for example the states of
Illinois and New Hampshire. Illinois seems to predicate invalidity of exculpation clauses
on "an obvious public interest in the relationship" coupled with inequality of bargaining
power. See, e.g., O'Callaghan v. Waller & Backlwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 438, 444, 155
N.E.2d 545, 546, 549 (1958). New Hampshire, in comparison, appears to find contracts at-
tempting to relieve a party from liability for negligence contrary to public policy and hence
invalid on the basis that erosion of legislatively or judicially imposed duties should be pre-
vented. See Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941) ; Wessman v. Boston &
M. R.R., 84 N.H. 475, 478-79, 152 Atl. 476, 479 (1930). It would seem that if a duty to search
title is imposed on the title insurer, subsequent exculpation should be denied no matter
whether the touchstone be public harm, inequality of bargaining power, or prevention of
erosion of judicially or legislatively imposed duties.
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run by exculpation since the insured may procure a title search from another
agency once he is explicitly told that he may not rely upon the insurer for a
search.5 3 Such an argument overlooks the fact that insurers commonly make
some search in order to estimate or decrease the risks involved in insuring a
particular piece of land.5 4 The insured pays for this search in the form of
higher premiums. 5 To force the insured to pay for these services and not
reap their benefits seems economically wasteful; to force him to pay again,
this time to a third party, in order to rely upon the findings of a search seems
clearly unfair.5 6 To the extent that exculpation necessitates an additional search,
the resources allocated to search may be needlessly doubled. When the insured
is forced to turn to another agency for title searching, this agency must
either duplicate the high cost recording system of a title plant " or else use the
notoriously inefficient public records.58 In either case resources are misal-
located: duplication frustrates efficiency by preventing intensive use of high
fixed cost facilities; utilization of the public records forces the insured and
society to pay for an inefficient method of search. Finally, the argument
overlooks the fact that in those states and cities where title insurance is most
used, the insured may in effect have no alternative agency to which to turn for
a title search.5 9 In such a case, to the extent that title insurers exculpate them-
selves, the choice is either to impose a duty of search on the title insurer
regardless of exculpation or to withhold the benefits of a search from the
insured.
53. Alternative agencies which may be available include the title attorney, the private
abstracter, the abstract company, and-in a few states-public abstract offices.
54. See REEVE 51-87; GAGE 86-89.
55. Searching costs consume the major portion of the premium dollar. GAGE 104-15;
Comment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 235, 247-48 (1951) ; Deatly, Give Thanks For Title Insurance,
Title News, Feb. 1960, pp. 11, 14.
56. As we view the matter it would be strange, indeed, if prospective purchasers of
real property could not rely upon title reports for which they are required to pay,
but must search the records themselves. If such be the law a large part of the value
of title companies would disappear.
J. H. Trisdale, Inc. v. Shasta County Title Co., 146 Cal. App. 2d 831, 839, 304 P.2d
832, 837 (1956).
57. GAGE 45-46, 150; Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 507 (1957). Duplica-
tion might not be necessary if title companies made their records available to all those who
needed them. Except in extremely rare instances, this "open-door" policy does not exist.
See Johnstone, supra at 506-07; VILLANOVA REPORT § 0.30, at 16 n.2 ("novel arrangement"
in Georgia).
58. See GAGE 34-38, 45; McDOUGAL & HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOcA-
TION;, PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT 117-18 (1948) ; Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1245-51 (1959).
59. In California, Oregon, and Washington, title insurance is so dominant that other
title assurance methods have generally disappeared. Russell & Bridewell, Systens of Land
Title Examination, 14 J. LAND & P.U. EcoN. 133, 134 (1938); Henley, The New Title
Insurance Policy Form, Title News, Sept. 1960, p. 2 ("[I]n California ... title insurance
is now completely dominant"). In various other states and cities, title insurance has largely
taken over the title business. See REPORT OF THE CoMMITTEE ox€ AccEPTABLE TITLES To
REAL PROPERTY, PROC. A.B.A. SEc. REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST LAW 43-51 (1953).
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The advisability of permitting exculpation and the proper construction of an
ambiguous contractual undertaking both ultimately turn on the desirability or
non-desirability of a title search. In resolving this issue a connected-in fact
almost obverse-issue must first be considered: does insurance coverage alone
adequately protect the insured? Various commentators have answered this
question with a resounding "no." 60 They point out that very little, if any,
insurance protection is actually given since title policies usually except defects
actually discovered and make blanket exceptions for various types of hard-to-
discover defects.6 1 In assessing the validity of this criticism one must dis-
tinguish between the two standard types of policies-the mortgagee policy
and the owner's policy. Unlike the typical individual owner, the large, well-
organized institutional lender is in a strong bargaining position in relation to
title companies, and the scope of insurance protection it extracts is almost
always broader than that given an owner.62 Moreover, even if the insurance
coverage were the same for both classes of policies, insurance protection alone
would be less adequate for owners than for mortgagees. The mortgagee looks
at the property primarily as security for his investment. Thus if the mortgagee
received insurance in the amount of his mortgage covering all possible defects,
insurance might be adequate. For the owner, however, even complete insurance
coverage for all defects would seem to be inadequate. As indicated previously,
conditions in the policy may prevent recovery until the property is sold or
until adverse legal claims are made or may even prevent any recovery at all.63
60. Roady, Professional Liability of Abstracters, 12 VAND. L. REv. 783, 794 (1959)
("title insurance ... a snare and a delusion for many policies written today exclude from
coverage the very risks that a vendee desires insured."); GAGE 99-102; McDougal &
Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 YA.E L.J. 1125 (1939); cf.
Bordwell, The Resurrection of Registration of Title, 7 U. Clri. L. REv. 470 (1940);
McDougal, Title Registration & Land Law Reform: A Reply, 8 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 63 (1940).
61. See articles cited note 60 supra; NORTH & VAN BuREN 251.
The practice of excepting discovered defects would seem far less injurious to the insured
than is the making of blanket exceptions. In the former situation, it is at least arguable
that the insured, once informed of the defect, can protect himself by seeking a release, or
by quieting title, or even by simply refusing to take the encumbered property. In the case
of blanket exceptions, however, as in the case of exculpation, the insured will either have
to pay a second agency to search title or perhaps even be forced to go without protection.
See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
62. See Johnstone, supra note 57, at 495-96, 504; VniLA~1ovA REPoRT § 0.20, at 8-12;
REEvE 48. For example, mortgagee policies usually insure against unmarketable title whereas
owners' policies generally do not. Compare ATA Standard Loan Policy-Revised Coverage
-1960, with ATA Owner's Policy-Standard Form A,-1960. ViLLANovA REPoRr, app. A,
at 296-306, app. B, at 309-19. Marketability coverage is available in the ATA Owner's
Policy-Standard Form B-1960 (additional coverage) for an added price. Id. at 319-28;
see Henley, The New Title Insurance Policy Form, Title News, Sept. 1960, pp. 2, 10. There
are indications, however, that this policy is not being widely used. Report of Atlantic Coast
Regional Conference, Title News, Jan. 1961, pp. 118, 120.
63. See notes 12 and 13 supra and accompanying text; Kuhlman v. Title Ins. Co., 177
F. Supp. 925 (W.D. Mo. 1959) ; Sandier v. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co., 66 N.J.
Super. 597, 169 A.2d 735 (1961).
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When the insurance is written for less than the fair market value of the
property, limitation of damages to the face amount of the policy may prevent full
recovery of loss.64 Finally, even full recovery of money damages may be
inadequate. Money alone is poor compensation for infringement of a new home
owner's privacy because of an undiscovered easement.66 If the individual
owner intends to develop or promote his property, he needs assurance that he
can do so, not money damages if he cannot.66
Even though insurance coverage alone does not adequately protect the
insured, the imposition of a duty to search might be undesirable if title com-
panies demanded prohibitive premiums in response to such a duty. The likeli-
hood of this contingency does not seem great. In the first place, so long as the
scope of duty imposed is only to make and disclose the findings of a reasonable
64. This may seem "fair" at first glance. The insured has only paid for X dollars worth
of protection and this should be the limit of his recovery. While this may be correct for
amounts paid for pure insurance protection, it is not true where part of the premium pays
for the actual cost of a title search. As the author of Comment, 39 CALiF. L. REv. 235, 247
(1951) points out, neither the risk of loss nor the cost of search increases proportionally
with the value of the property. Thus it seems unfair to charge the insured for the cost of a
search and then restrict his recovery. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
On the other hand, to the extent that actual cost in searching title is not used to fix the
insurance premium, there may be a subsidy to the owners of very low value or small-per-
centage-insured property. The actual cost of searching title for such property would probably
be prohibitive; utilization of an average dollar cost for both the risk of loss and for ex-
penses incident to searching the title shifts a disproportionate share of expense to the high
value and/or high-percentage-insured property owner. See Arnold, Title Evidence in
Washington State, Title News, Mar. 1961, pp. 2, 6. But see Spencer, Title Insurance for
Cooperative Banks, Title News, June 1960, pp. 16, 20 (insurance must be for full value of
property).
Assuming that owners of high value property are better able to bear the cost of in-
surance and searching, this subsidization may increase alienability of land. See Comment,
39 CALIF. L. REv. 235, 247 & n.73 (1951) ; note 84 infra and accompanying text. However,
such subsidization may also cause a slight distortion in the best allocation of property if
we adopt the highest and best use theory of land use and also a marginal revenue theory of
investment. See BARLowE, LAND REsouRcE EcoNoMIcs: THE PoLITIcAL EcoNoMy OF
RuRAL & URBAN LAND RESOURCE USE 13-15 (1958) ; see generally id. 112-49.
65. See, e.g., Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. v. Frieder, -Colo.-, 362 P.2d 555 (1961)
(building had to be relocated because of undisclosed easement).
Even if damages were adequate compensation, the inconvenience and delay in filing claims
or engaging in a law suit would still remain. See GAGE 52-53 ("The courts are poor media
for the collection of damages from the standpoint of the average person.") ; cf. Udell v.
City Title Ins. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 78, 208 N.Y.S2d 504 (1960) (necessary to engage in
lawsuit with third party or have contract of sale rejected before recovery from title com-
pany possible).
66. See Johnstone, mspra note 57, at 494; McDougal, Title Registration & Land
Reform: A Reply, 8 U. CHr. L. REv. 63, 70 (1940). This conclusion is painfully borne out
by the cases. See, e.g., James Poultry Co. v. City of Nebraska City, 135 Neb. 787, 284
N.W. 273, aff'd, 136 Neb. 456, 286 N.W. 337 (1939) (poultry business upset by zoning
restriction) ; Korn v. Campbell, 192 N.Y. 490, 85 N.E. 687 (1908) (land use limited by
restrictive covenant to residential uses) ; Finley v. Glen, 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299 (1931)
(restrictive covenants prevented building of factory).
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search, there probably will be no great increase in the searching expenses of
most title companies. As pointed out above, most reputable title companies
already undertake a search and maintain efficient title plants for that purpose.0 7
Nor are companies which rely upon an attorney's or abstracter's search of
title apt to find searching costs greatly increased so long as the scope
of search is restricted to that of a reasonable search and care is used in select-
ing the title searching agent. In the second place, imposing liability for negli-
gent search would probably not increase premiums unduly. The ratio of loss
to premiums generally varies from 1.5 to 3 per cent. 8 Even doubling the
amount of loss is thus likely to increase premiums by less than 3 per cent.
The occasional title company that attempts to insure on a purely actuarial basis,
however, might be seriously affected by such a duty.69 But strong policies in
favor of free alienability of land suggest that this method of insurance, which
may foster further confusion of title by ignoring the possible existence of
hidden defects,70 should not be indiscriminately encouraged. Finally, even
where imposition of a duty would increase searching expenses and liability
costs, these increases might not be reflected in higher premiums. In those
geographic areas in which there are other institutions assuring titles, competi-
tion may partially restrain the prices charged by the insurance companies. 71
In addition, state regulation may restrict rate increases. 72 On the other hand,
in those areas where title insurance has completely or nearly completely re-
placed other institutions and in the absence of state regulation of rates, the
insurance company would probably shift the added expense.
67. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
68. The ratio of loss to premiums naturally varies from company to company and from
year to year for any given company; in addition, inadequate data prevents a determination of
the exact amount of loss. Nonetheless, various surveys, estimates, and reports made to
public agencies all indicate the low average ratio of loss to premiums. GAGE 111-14 ("central
tendency is not far from ... 1.5%") ; HuFBNER, PROPERTY INsuRANCE 497 (1922) ("losses
paid are trivial") ; Johnstone, supra note 57, at 501 & n.34 ("national loss ratio for 1954,
based on reports of public agencies was 1.69 per cent") ; Comment, 39 CALIF L. REv. 235,
248 (1951) (limited surveys showed averages of 1.5% in 1920, 0.96% in 1928, 3.21% in
1937; the 321% figure is probably high since it included losses from mortgage guarantee
business as well as losses from title insurance business).
69. See note 26 supra.
70. If broadly applied, the typical casualty insurance approach to risk assumption could
have a disastrous effect on titles. If title insurance generally were written on a risk
basis only, without search or examination, there would be a gradual deterioration in
the certainty of titles .... The apparent trend toward more widespread adoption of
the casualty approach in title underwriting should be watched with care.
Johnstone, supra note 57, at 516.
71. See Payne, The Why, What, and How of Uniform Title Standards, 7 ALA. L. REv.
25, 29 (1954) (individual examiner can compete successfully if reforms reduce the burden of
examination) ; Johnstone, supra note 57, at 517; Exclusive or Dual Agencies, Title News,
Jan. 1961, pp. 95-101.
72. See Gould, Title Insurance as Viewed from the Aspect of Supervision, Title News,
Jan. 1960, pp. 64, 66-68. See generally VLLAovA REPORT §§ 7.10-.54.
1174 [Vol. 71 :1161
TITLE INSURANCE
Even in the absence of undue increases in insurance premiums, imposition
of a duty to search may be undesirable for other reasons. Title insurance
companies often "pass" those discovered defects which in the opinion of the
insurer will not cause subsequent loss or which are considered so minor as
to be de minimis. 73 Such defects are not entered as exceptions in the title
policy. Thus as far as the insured is concerned, these defects do not exist.
Placing a duty of search and disclosure upon the title company will compel
full disclosure of these defects. Thus, to some extent, the function of evaluat-
ing them may be shifted back to the lay owner. This shift seems undesirable
since the risks of losing title will loom larger to him than it would to an
institution bearing risks on an actuarial basis. 74 A hypertechnical judicial
concept of marketability magnifies this potential risk of loss. 75 Moreover, the
private individual can probably expect little aid from the average attorney
who, concerned for his reputation in the community, may tread lightly through
the ambiguous area of marketability.76 As a result, the layman might well
seek to clear title with an expensive quiet title suit or else forego an ad-
vantageous investment. 7 To the extent that title companies may remain
willing to insure after disclosure, however, these problems of evaluation would
be alleviated.
Imposing a duty to search may also frustrate attempts to increase the in-
surance protection given the insured if the scope of the duty to search is made
coextensive with the coverage of the insurance policy. Constant pressure from
owners and large investment lenders to expand the scope of coverage has
been gradually eroding those areas of blanket exception traditionally found in
the early insurance policies. 8 Title companies are increasingly insuring against
such defects as zoning restrictions, mechanics' liens, and tax liens.7 9 Such
73. See REmV 72-73, 77.
74. Gage points out that the risks of loss because of title defects stem from "an
element of chance in the search" as well as "from facts which are not to be found within
the system of public records." GAGE 34-35. In order to properly gauge such risks, there
must be an awareness of the frequency and amounts of loss. See Morris, Enterprise
Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YAE L.J. 554,
560-67 (1961) ; see generally K=LP, CASUALTY INSURANCE 458-532 (3d ed. 1956); Kulp,
The Rate-Making Process- in Property and Casualty Insurance-Goals, Technics, and
Limits, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 493 (1950). The layman does not have the awareness
nor does he experience sufficient losses from defects to develop such awareness.
75. BAS E § 3, at 6, § 5, at 16-17; DUNHAM, MODERN R,.x.L ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
629 (2d ed. 1958) ; Morton, New Horizons, Title News, Jan. 1960, pp. 11, 17; cf. Townshend
v. Goodfellow, 40 Minn. 312, 316, 41 N.W. 1056, 1057 (1889) ; Douglass v. Ransom, 205
Wis. 439,237 N.W. 260 (1931).
76. See BASYE § 5, at 16-17.
77. Id. § 203, at 294; Comment, Enhancing the Marketability of Land: The Suit to
Quiet Title, 68 YALE L.J. 1245 (1959).
78. See ViLLANovA REPORT § 0.20, at 11-12; Vietmeyer, "Reflections of a Customer,"
Title News, Jan. 1961, pp. 126, 128-29; Schmidt, Title Losses, Title News, Jan. 1959, p. 27.
79. Institutional investors expect their owner's policy, as does the mortgagee policy to
afford protection against mechanics' liens, parties in possession, survey readings
and marketability. Currently, a substantial volume of the policies offered to investors
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defects may well pose the largest threats of restricted use and potential loss to
the owner."" Yet these are the areas in which discovery is most difficult.81
Finding a duty to search those areas in which there has been an undertaking
to insure may well prevent or even reverse increases in insurance coverage.
The cost of searching may be prohibitive.82 Or the possibility that a court
may adopt a tort theory of liability for negligent search and award damages
greater than the face amount of the policy may preclude accurate actuarial
treatment of the risks, thereby curtailing the companies' expansion of in-
surance protection in these areas.8 3 To the extent that questions of reasonable
must be returned for a more satisfactory policy form or for the elimination of un-
acceptable exceptions.
Bonnin, Mutuality of Interest, Title News, Jan. 1959, pp. 119, 125; REEVE 60, 80; Report
of Chairman, Southwest Region, Title News, Jan. 1960, p. 74. But see Henley, The New
Title Insurance Policy Form, Title News, Sept. 1960, pp. 2, 7-8 (ATA Uniform Policy
does not insure against zoning despite investor pressures).
80. See, e.g., Comment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 235, 238 (1951) (tax liens) ; Henley, supra
note 79, at 7 (zoning restrictions).
81. See Henley, supra note 79, at 7 (noting difficulties in protecting from zoning
restrictions). Because mechanics' liens may attach to property prior to filing or may
relate back to a time earlier than the date of filing, discovery may be nearly impossible.
Physical inspection of the property as well as search of the public records is necessary to
discover these defects. See Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 138, 152, 155 (1958). State tax liens,
since mere assessment of the tax may give rise to a lien, necessitate an extensive examina-
tion of current tax rolls, inquiries about possible gift or estate taxes, and a search of past
tax records. Even though general federal tax liens must be filed before becoming valid
against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees, the common practice of filing "blanket"
notices covering all the property of a taxpayer without any specific reference to or
description of property makes their discovery particularly difficult. See Wright, Title
Examinations in Michigan as Affected by the General Federal Tax Lien, 51 MicH.
L. Rnv. 183-86, 192-99 (1953); Core, Tax Forfeiture Problems in the Examination of
Abstracts, 12 AR. L. Raw. 333 (1958). Special federal gift and estate tax liens are also
particularly troublesome. Ascertainment of the time and manner of attaching as well as
determination of what property is covered by such liens may be nearly impossible. See
Wright, supra at 325-26, 335-40 (1953).
82. To the extent that the title company must look outside its own records to discover
defects, costs may be prohibitive. See GAGE 87-89. However, insofar as extraneous matters
can be put upon the company's records in the title plant, the costs of discovering such defects
should not prove unduly high. See id. at 87. And since it appears that "losses which arise
from a non-record origin are considerably less important than those which arise from the
record," there probably need not be "any great increase in rates on policies which cover every
contingency." Id. at 131. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
83. So long as the insurer can limit its maximum possible liability, it is possible to pro-
rate premiums on this amount. Where, however, there is no maximum, the insurer has no
basis upon which to set its premium. See Spencer, Title Insurance for Co-operative Banks,
Title News, June 1960, pp. 16,20:
[T]he title companies must require the owner to take out a policy which covers the
value of his property. Actuarially, it would not be feasible to permit the owner of a
property worth $100,000 to carry only $20,000 of title insurance.
If the scope of insurance coverage is not used to control (broaden) the scope of a reason-
able search, tort liability for negligent search can be imposed even while allowing the
insurer to set a maximum on liability under the insurance coverage.
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search are kept separate from the scope of insurance coverage, however, these
dangers can be avoided.
The inadequacy of insurance coverage alone and the importance of dis-
closure to the individual owner thus appears to outweigh the disadvantages of
imposing a duty to search. The soundness of this conclusion becomes more evi-
dent when the interests of society in general are considered. To protect society
adequately a method of assuring title should at least increase the unrestricted
alienation of land,84 facilitate the determination of the nature and extent of
existing rights in land,8 5 and facilitate efficient risk and resource allocation. s6
These broad objectives are, of course, interrelated. Determining the nature
and extent of the rights existent in land will allow freer transfer of these
rights. Disclosure of rights held by others or disclosure of restrictions on the
use of land will facilitate efficient resource allocation. Reduction of the risks
from undiscovered title defects fosters more certain analysis and planning
which in turn will lead to greater economic efficiency in the use of land.8 7 It
seems self-evident, given our present recordation system, that an adequate
title search is necessary to determine the nature and extent of existing rights
in land. It also seems obvious that there must be a determination of the
quantum of rights which are being bought and sold in order to bring about free
alienation of these rights. In order for investors, owners, developers, and
promoters to act wisely-that is, in order to have efficient allocation of land
resources in our private enterprise economy-there must be disclosure of the
rights and restrictions upon the property being developed. A prospective
businessman must have assurance that he can indeed sell his wares and that
customers will have easy access to his contemplated location before he can
make an intelligent choice of a business site. To effectuate these social in-
terests and individual needs, insurance coverage alone is inadequate; a duty
to search title and disclose defects must also be imposed.
Despite the desirability of a title search, courts, because of the doctrine of
freedom of contract, may well be reluctant to overturn clear exculpatory
clauses and find a duty to search outside of express contractual terms and
the factual circumstances surrounding them.8 8 Freedom of contract, however,
84. See BASYE § 1, at 3, § 374; McDouGAL & HABER, PRoPERTY, WEALTH LAND:
ALLOCATION, PLANNING & DEvELOPmENT 78-80 (1948); NORTH & VAN BUEN 243; GAGE
11-14.
85. See McDOUGAL & HABER, op. cit. stpra note 84, at 78; Basye, Improvenzent of
Conveyancing Procedure, 36 NEB. L. REv. 81, 82 (1957) ; Payne, The Crisis in Conveyanc-
ing, 19 Mo. L. REv. 214,216 (1954).
86. GAGE 14-15, 148; MCDOUGAL & HABER, op. cit. supra note 84, at 42-43; Vietmeyer,
"Reflections of a Custoner," Title News, Jan. 1961, pp. 126, 129.
87. Insurance itself is, of course, of major importance in facilitating this broad goal.
88. See, e.g., Knouse v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 163 Kan. 213, 216, 181 P.2d
310, 312 (1947) ("may not make another contract for the parties") ; Union Realty Co. v.
Ahern, 93 A.2d 84 (D.C. Munic. App. 1952) (court refused to hold company liable because
of disclaimer of responsibility for correctness of information relating to taxes and assess-
ments) ; Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Wash. 2d 594, 604, 174 P.2d 961, 967
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is not an absolute. The social interest in disclosure, the fact that title com-
panies do commonly make a search, and the weak economic power of the
typical private buyer or seller of land, all combine to recommend the third
approach set forth at the beginning of this Note--finding in the relationship
of the parties a duty to search title. In this regard there is a spectrum of posi-
tions which courts might take and to varying degrees have taken when faced
with standardized mass contracts written by large scale enterprises.
Courts, under the guise of interpretation, have attempted to redress the
inequities resulting from standardized contracts either by strictly construing
the contract against the maker 8 9 or by purposely creating ambiguity where
there is no ambiguity so that the fictional void could be filled with a just result.90
Decisions in title insurance cases manifest both these approaches. 91 It may be
doubted, however, whether either approach is wholly desirable. Strictly con-
struing the policy against the insurer seems warranted in the situation of an
owner's policy where the insurer's bargaining power and economic strength is
typically far greater than that of the average disorganized and unknowing
ownerP2 In the mortgagee policy situation, however, the stronger bargaining
(1946) ("a court is not at liberty to revise a contract under theory of construing it; ...
neither abstract justice, nor any rule of construction, justifies the creation of a contract" not
made by the parties).
89. The rule [of construction against the maker] is hardly to be regarded as truly a
rule of interpretation; its application does not help to determine the meaning that the
two parties gave to the words, or even the meaning that a reasonable person would
have given to the language used. It is chiefly a rule of public policy, generally
favoring the under dog.
3 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 559, at 268-70 (2d ed. 1960).
90. See Llewellyn, What Price Contracti-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704, 732-34 (1931); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HAIv. L. REV. 700, 702-03 (1939);
cf. 3 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 534, at 11-12 (2d ed. 1960).
91. Construction against the maker. See, e.g., Miller v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 112
F. Supp. 221, 225 (E.D. Va. 1953) ; National Holding Co. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 45 Cal.
App. 2d 215, 113 P.2d 906 (1941); Houston Title Guar. Co. v. Fontenot, 339 S.W.2d 347,
350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
Creation of ambiguity. See, e.g., Place v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co., 67 Minn. 126,
69 N.W. 706 (1897) (adverse possession rights were not excepted by clause excluding defects
because of "tenancy by the present occupants") ; Henkels v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co.,
177 Pa. Super. 110, 110 A2d 878 (1955) (statement in title certificate clearly excepting
property subject to a tax lien held to be exception for insurance coverage only and not for
duty to search) ; Marandino v. Lawyers' Title Ins. Corp., 156 Va. 696, 159 S.E. 181 (1931)
(insurer held to have assumed risk of faulty description by describing property in in-
surance policy and noting ordinance which took some of insured's property).
92. The relatively small number of title companies, the high expense required in setting
up adequate search facilities, and the large volume of business done by major companies
give title insurers a natural monopoly and all the power that entails. GAGE 150. The number
of title insurance companies operating in the United States has been estimated at between
160 and 180. Grimes, The Lawyer, His Client and Title Inmrance, Title News, Sept.
1958, pp. 2, 5. The volume of business is sometimes staggering: Chicago Title and Trust
Company, for example, has issued over 5 million policies. Title Milestones, Title News,
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power is apt to be possessed by the insured-usually a large, well-organized
institutional lender-rather than by the insurer. The insured is often instru-
mental in dictating the terms of the contract or even in writing the policy
itselfY3 In such a case the application of a uniform rule of construction against
the apparent "maker" of the contract is not warranted. Nor does judicial
creation of ambiguity seem a desirable response. In the first place society
has to pay a high price in the form of increased litigation for the resulting
uncertainty in the lawY4 In the second place this "interpretation" device
results in a constant struggle between draftsmen of standardized contracts
and the courts. Contract clauses become longer and more complex as drafts-
men attempt to keep one step ahead of adventuresome courts.95 Such com-
plexity in drafting may well leave the insured less and less aware of what it is
that is being promised. It may also lead to ambiguities and inconsistencies
which will provide greater room for justifiable court intervention.
A far more desirable approach is that suggested by Professor Kessler's
well-known article on contracts of adhesion. 96 The article points to the in-
adequacy of judicial attempts to maintain the unity of the law of contracts in
the face of widespread use of standardized "contracts of adhesion" and
admonishes the courts that the "task of adjusting ... the common law of
contracts to contracts of adhesion has to be faced squarely and not indirect-
ly."'0 7 The mortgagee policy of title insurance seems generally the product of
true bilateral bargaining, and courts should continue to respect the terms
which the parties have negotiated. The individual owner's title policy, how-
ever, seems a typical situation of adhesion where the "choice" of the in-
dividual is limited to taking or leaving what he is given. Here the courts
should not be hesitant, even while restricting themselves to a contract theory,
Feb. 1960, pp. 28-29. See Johnstone, supra note 57, at 492 & n.4, 505 & nn.51-52 (dollar
volumes and operating areas). In contrast to this institutional strength the typical owner has
little power or experience. See DUNHAm, MODERN REAL ESTATE TRxANSACroNs 283-85
(2d ed. 1958).
93. See Johnstone, supra note 57, at 502-05. Henley's historical analysis of the develop-
ment of the A.T.A.'s uniform policies provides an illustration of the methods by which large
institutional lenders exercise their great bargaining strength constantly to expand the scope
of policies written for their benefit. Henley, The New Title Itsurance Policy Form, Title
News, Sept. 1960, pp. 2,4-9.
94. See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J.
704, 732 (1931) :
'[C]onstruing' the particular language in question not to have intended the result
it did intend . . .kills security in transactions, if 'security' means predictability of
actions at law. No man is safe when language is to be read in the teeth of its intent.
Nor is even the party who is being protected safe, this side of final judgment, in
having got what he thinks he has bought ....
95. Id. at 732-34 ("Meantime the greater bargainor, defeated once and again, recurs to
the attack. After each case he can redraft and fight again.") ; Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion
-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 tCoLum. L. REv. 629 (1943).
96. Kessler, supra note 95.
97. Id. at 637.
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to rewrite the insurance policy in order to reflect the relationship between the
typical owner and the typical insurer.98 By recognizing the needs and expecta-
tions of the individual owner,99 his lack of bargaining power,10 and the
social implications of the owner-insurer relationship, 101 a court reasonably
and legitimately could read into the title policy an implied-in-law promise to
search title with due care---a promise which should not be subject to exculpa-
tion.10 2 The same technique might be described in terms of tort doctrine as
imposing a status relationship on the parties and finding in that relationship a
duty of the insurer to search and disclose.1' 3 Adhesion contracts in the field
of title insurance, as in other growing areas of the law, 1° 4 exert pressure on
the thin conceptual line between tort and contract, and perhaps raise questions
as to the utility of such a line. 0 Whichever doctrinal formulation is employed,
the judicial establishment of a duty to search will, at small cost to the
insurer, provide the individual owner with information necessary for his
protection and enable him to take prudent investment action.
Finding or imposing a duty to search, however, merely begins the job. A
court must also define the scope of a reasonable search and must resolve the
problems of what kind of liability should be imposed for breach of the duty to
search. As indicated above, the scope of a reasonable search should not be
made co-extensive with the areas insured against since such a definition might
98. There are, of course, powerful institutional owners and weak, disorganized lenders.
But if a workable judicial rule is to be adopted-a rule on which both insureds and insurers
may rely in their relationship-categories or classes rather than particular persons must be
considered in determining relative bargaining power. See 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1751C,
at 4968 (rev. ed. 1938) ; cf. text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
99. Applicants for a title insurance policy are interested in obtaining the insurance
coverage but they are sometimes more interested in what the company's examination
of title disclosures.
Johnstone, supra note 57, at 494. See GAGE 11.
100. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
102. See note 52 supra.
103. See PROSSER, TORTS § 1, at 5 (2d ed. 1955) ; Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv.
L. REv. 72, 75-77 (1942).
104. Compare the breakdown in warranty cases of the common law contractual concept
that only those persons who are parties to a bargain can sue for breach of it. This move-
ment from contract to status is ably discussed and aptly climaxed in Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
105. There are various relationships similar to that of title insurer and insured which
will support either a tort or a contract theory of liability. See PROSSER, TORTS § 81 (2d ed.
1955). The judicial confusion resulting from this ambiguity has produced "a forest of flat,
stale, and unprofitable cases." Prosser, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED
Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 433 (1954). Some of the confusion may be ascribed to the
historical development of these two theories from their common ancestor-the common law
of trespass. Id. at 380-85. Perhaps the only real utility in the line is the verbal leverage it




curtail the expansion of casualty protection.106 Moreover, if a reasonable
search were held to include such difficult-to-discover items as tax liens and
zoning restrictions, title insurance companies might find themselves forced
to charge prohibitive premiums.'0o Items which fall clearly outside of those
sources that a typical searcher would consult thus should not be read into
a legally-imposed duty. As to such items the insured will have to rely on
insurance protection or purchase additional search at a separate cost.0 8 In
the inevitable area of ambiguity between items clearly included in and items
clearly excluded from a reasonable search the courts must inquire into the
economic feasibility of discovering various types of defects. As this inquiry
takes place case by case, both title insurance companies and their insureds
will have an opportunity to put forth their views fully, and the outlines of a
reasonable search can be delineated pramatically and flexibly.109
In resolving the problem of what kind of liability should be imposed for
breach of a duty to search, a court must choose between contract and tort
theories. Since under either theory of liability the complaint will usually
speak in terms of negligent action, a court must be careful not to confuse
the preliminary question of whether the insurer is liable for a negligent search
with the later question of whether that liability is contractual or tortious in
nature. Many of the cases seem to have confused these two issues." 0 Allega-
tions of negligent action should not lead automatically to adoption of a tort
or "negligence" theory of liability. Inasmuch as the duty to use reasonable
care is ultimately grounded in the insurance contract relationship, contract
liability is equally appropriate. As with the choice of the theory to adopt in
imposing a duty to search,"' the choice here seems essentially arbitrary. And
if both choices are abitrary, the theory adopted in resolving the preliminary
issue can afford no assistance in deciding which theory of liability to adopt.
Equally inconclusive is the line of reasoning adopted by some courts in the
past that the liability of title insurers for negligent search should, by analogy,
106. See notes 78-83 supra and accompanying text.
107. See note 82 and text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
108. Special searches and other services are already being provided for the insured at
an additional cost. For example, the title company may undertake foreclosure searches,
judgment searches, or tax searches. See NORTH & VANz BUREN 258-59.
109. Cf. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 NJ. 582, 596, 170 A.2d 791,
799 (1961) ("step by step process affords the light of continued experience to guide
[the law's] future course") ; Walker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 666, 130
A.2d 372,377 (1957).
Among the relevant guides to defining the scope of a reasonable search would be the
searching practices and searching facilities which prevail in the community in question. One
of the best guides might be the local bar associations' prevailing title standards. See, e.g.,
Basye, Improvement of Conveyancing Procedure, 36 NEB. L. REv. 81, 90-92 (1956).
110. See, e.g., M.R.M. Realty Co. v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 120, 125, 200
N.E. 666, 667-68 (1936) ; Sperling v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 227 App. Div. 5, 10, 236 N.Y.
Supp. 553, 558-59 (1929).
111. See notes 98-105 supra and accompanying text.
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be the same as that of their predecessors :"m the liability of an abstracter has
generally been treated as contractual in nature while that of an attorney has
sounded in tort.11 3 With such uncertainty it might seem that the arguments
of counsel would eventually prove conclusive. Here again, however, since
both theories offer litigation advantages, 114 no exact answer can be given as to
the liability which should be adopted. This situation seemingly allows a court
112. See, e.g., Sandier v. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co., 66 N.J. Super. 597, 169
A.2d 735 (1961) ; Glyn v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 132 App. Div. 859, 117 N.Y. Supp.
424 (1909); Ehmer v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 156 N.Y. 10, 34 N.Y. Supp. 1132,
50 N.E. 420 (1898) ; Henkels v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 177 Pa. Super. 110, 110 A.2d
878 (1955). See note 45 suepra and accompanying text.
113. Why this distinction should exist is unclear. It is clear, however, that the bulk of
litigation against abstracters has proceeded on a theory of contract. WARVELLE, AnSTRACTS
& EXAMINATIONS OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY § 10 (4th ed. 1921) ; Roady, Professional
Liability of Abstracters, 12 VAND. L. Rxv. 783, 784 (1959) ; Title Symposium: Abstractor's
[sic] Liability in Examination of Title, 6 Wyo. L.J. 184 (1952) ; Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 891, 900
(1953) ("With only occasional dissent, the cases agree that the liability of the abstractor is
purely contractual.") While the attorney's liability similarly arises out of a contractual
relationship, it more frequently sounds in tort than in contract. See Wade, The Attorney's
Liability, for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 757 (1959) ; Title Symposium: Attorney's
Liability in Title Examination, 6 Wyo. L. REv. 171 & n.1 (1952) ; Isaacs, Liability of the
Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 39 (1935) ; Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1389 (1920). Wade
states that this issue "has not troubled the courts often and [that] there has been little dis-
cussion of it" Wade, supra at 756 & n.10.
114. Contract, for example, may entail a lesser burden of pleading and proof since
liability will attach on a showing of the mere existence of an encumbrance on the property,
whereas a tort action would require proof of negligence or some other wrongful conduct in
the search of title. See, e.g., Glickman v. Home Title Guar. Co., 8 Misc. 2d 303, 167 N.Y.S.2d
793 (1957) ; Empire Dev. Co. v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E. 468 (1918).
Similarly there may be no need to prove reliance. See Maggio v. Abstract Title & Mortgage
Corp., 277 App. Div. 940, 98 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1950). A longer statute of limitations may allow
contractual recovery even after the tort action has been barred. Cf. Manning v. 1234 Corp.,
174 Misc. 36, 20 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1940) (whether assault and battery action under tort or
under contract). This advantage may be relatively unimportant in suits against title insurance
companies as compared to suits against title attorneys or abstracters since the statute of
limitations for negligent search usually does not begin to run against title companies until
the overlooked defect or encumbrance is discovered; in comparison, the statute of limitations
usually begins to run against title attorneys and abstracters when the faulty title opinion or
abstract is given even though an action cannot be brought until actual damage or loss has
been suffered. Title Symposium: Attorneys' Liability in Title Examination, supra, at 186
& n.26; Roady, supra note 113, at 792-93. Other potential advantages of contract theory may
be recovery of loss of bargain damages where these might exceed damages recoverable in
tort, recovery of interest from the date of the breach, survival of the action, additional
remedies such as summary judgment or attachment, and greater opportunities for forum
shopping.
Generally speaking, the greatest advantage in suing in tort comes from the likelihood of
greater damages. The limitations imposed by the contract on the maximum damages recover-
able may be avoided by suing in tort. See, e.g., Quigley v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co.,
60 Minn. 275, 62 N.W. 287 (1895); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 972 (1958). In addition the
potentially wider scope of proximate cause under a tort theory may extend to items not in-
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to choose the theory which most dearly effectuates desirable social action.
Tort theory, in that it offers potentially greater damages and perhaps provides
a wider scope of duty, would seem to be more effective in forcing title com-
panies to make a diligent search. 15 However, care should be taken to limit tort
liability to situations in which there is a showing of negligence. Liability must
be hinged to the concept of a reasonable search, and when defects are of a type
not reasonably discovered no liability should be imposed." 6 This limitation
will leave treatment of undiscoverable defects to the insurance function and
thereby promote efficient risk analysis and risk spreading without unnecessarily
reducing the expansion of casualty insurance coverage.
Judicial conservatism may necessitate legislation. A court may refuse to
impose a duty because such a duty is contrary to the clear intent of the insurer,
or because it feels incapable of defining an economically reasonable search. One
legislative response might be to place in a regulatory agency the tasks of
defining and enforcing a reasonable search for the benefit of the recipients of
title insurance. Insurance commissions are already beginning to take an active
role in the regulation of title insurance. 17 Yet the difficulties of securing
legislation in states where title companies maintain strong lobbies, the prob-
lems of keeping a specialized agency independent of the institution regulated,
and the competence of courts to handle delicate problems of reasonableness on
a scale of community standards, combine to suggest that control in this area
be left with the judiciary. Where it is possible to secure legislation, it should
be drawn in general terms. Overly detailed legislation may crystallize in-
stitutional standards and practices, thereby hindering the development of new
searching methods." 8 A statement that a title insurer must make a reasonable
title search and must reveal to the insured all defects discovered prior to
cludable under a contract theory; a tort theory may permit the plaintiff to avoid possible
set-offs or counterclaims; and tort recovery may be possible where a contract action would
fail for lack of proof. See PROSSER, TORTS § 81, at 483-86 (2d ed. 1955).
115. See note 114 supra. Not only will tort theory provide more adequate protection to
the insured and greater incentive toward a careful search on the part of the insurer because
of its potentially greater damages, but it may also provide the courts with a more flexible
instrument in effecting their task of defining a reasonable search. Cf. Dorr v. Massachusetts
Title Ins. Co., 23 Mass. 490, 131 N.E. 191 (1921) (tort recovery for defects expressly
excepted from the insurance policy where surrounding circumstances were such that the
company should have given notice of the defect to the insured before the policy was issued) ;
Ehmer v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 156 N.Y. 10, 50 N.E. 420 (1898) (tort recovery where
insurance contract issued for wrong property and contract recovery was thereby pre-
cluded).
116. See text accompanying notes 106-09 mpra.
117. See VILLANOVA REPORT §§ 1.10, 1.31. Most regulation has been directed toward
ensuring financial responsibility. Id. at §§ 6.10-.90. Regulation may also take place through
the indirect method of licensing requirements. Id. at §§ 4.10-.40.
118. Consider, for example, the increasing use and development of microfilm and
photographic techniques for the "take-off" (copying) of public records. Waddell, Record
Creation and Retention, Title News, Mar. 1961, p. 26; Shedd, Microfilm Take-Offs, Title
News, July 1960, p. 19.
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issuing a policy of insurance should suffice."19 Such a directive would ensure
the imposition of a duty to search while leaving the delicate task of defining
the "reasonable search" to the courts, where primary responsibility in this
area-with or without express legislative support-should remain.
119. Past legislation concerning title insurance indicates there is great danger of poor
draftsmanship in the title insurance area. See, e.g., BASYE § 5, at 18-19 ("sporadic and not
systematic, restrictive and not comprehensive"); Burlingame, Villanova Project Report,
Title News, Jan. 1961, pp. 23-24 ("in all but a few instances legislative bodies have avoided
any sensible or coherent pattern in adopting legislation").
A recent statute enacted as compromise legislation, even though written in general terms,
manifests some of these shortcomings:
Nothing in this subdivision shall authorize an insurance company to issue a policy
of title insurance in this state until the applicant therefor has been notified in writing
by such company of all defects in title which will be excluded from coverage under the
prospective policy. Such notice shall set forth in descriptive terms the nature of such
excluded defects. Upon receipt of such notice, the applicant shall have the option of
cancelling his application without any liability therefor to said company.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3301(7) (Supp. 1961). For the history and an evaluation of this
legislation see Rawlings, Report of Chairman of Title Insurance Section, Title News, Jan.
1960, pp. 54-55. The language of the statute itself is ambiguous. Insofar as it suggests that
the title insurer must make a search prior to the issuance of insurance it is sound. If, on
the other hand, the statute is interpreted merely to require that the company state the
areas of blanket exception, it will be inadequate. It also seems inadequate in that it possibly
fails to allow the insurer to charge for a search in the event that insurance is not issued.
Even though the statute provides for judicial definition of the duty to search, the fact that
the duty has been legislatively imposed should prevent exculpation since exculpation of a
statutory duty is generally not allowed. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1751B, at 4966 (rev. ed.
1936).
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